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ANTITRUST AND THE POLITICS OF STATE ACTION
THOMAS B. NACHBAR*
ABSTRACT
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court
refused to exempt the board from the second element of Parker
immunity—active supervision by the state—because the Board was
made up largely of “active market participants.” This Article argues
that the “active market participant” rule laid out in North Carolina
State Board, while intuitively appealing, ignores important political
values represented by antitrust law, values most evident in the
context of state action immunity. By focusing on the potential market
harm from self-interested regulators, the Court ignored a series of
political harms inherent in the structure of the North Carolina State
Board of Dental Examiners, harms having little to do with whether
the members of the board were market participants. The result in
North Carolina State Board is misguided, but should not be
surprising. It is the natural result of the Court’s reliance on an
economically oriented test—the Midcal/Hallie framework—for what
is a political rather than an economic problem. Thus, North Carolina
State Board is not so much a misapplication of the modern antitrust
law of state action as it is a demonstration of how state action law
has gone awry and how the Court can return it to its political roots.
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Rebecca
Haw Allensworth, Peter Carstensen, Alan Meese, Nate Oman, Barak Orbach, and Danny
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INTRODUCTION
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,1 the
Supreme Court considered whether attempts by North Carolina’s
dental regulatory board (the Board) to prevent nondentists from
engaging in teeth whitening should be immune from antitrust
scrutiny by virtue of the doctrine of “state action immunity” first
developed in Parker v. Brown.2 As established by North Carolina
law, an overwhelming majority of the Board (six of eight seats) must
be dentists who are elected by the state’s licensed dentists.3 The
Board is charged with the regulation of dentistry in the state, which
includes the prohibition of unlicensed dentistry.4 Consequently, the
state’s dentists are effectively in control not only of the practice of
dentistry but also of defining what constitutes dentistry.5 This
means that their regulations can have considerable effects on non-
dentists, including both patients (who purchase the dental services
regulated by the Board) and nondentist practitioners of similar
services (who might be excluded by them).6 That is exactly what
happened in the case of teeth whitening, which the Board deter-
mined to be “the practice of dentistry” and therefore required a
license from the Board to perform.7 
When one considers the kind of regulatory power the Board
wields, and its effects on nondentists,8 it might seem a little strange
to vest control of the Board exclusively in the state’s dentists. Don’t
we all have a stake in the question of how dentistry is performed?
Why should we nondentists be effectively excluded from regulating
such a substantial part of our economy?
1. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107-08 (2015).
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). I will alternatively refer to the doctrine as “state action
immunity” and “Parker immunity,” as the Court itself has done over time.
3. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1108. A dental hygienist, who is elected by the state’s
licensed hygienists, occupies one seat, and a “consumer” representative, who is appointed by
the Governor, occupies the final seat. Id.
4. Id. at 1107.
5. See id. at 1107-08.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1108.
8. See id. at 1107-08.
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The Court in North Carolina State Board analyzed the problem
from the standpoint of self-dealing; it was problematic that the
Board was made up largely of practicing dentists.9 But that misses
the point. The problem is not that the dentists are self-interested;
the problem is that in a republican government it is the people, not
its dentists, who set regulatory policy.10 Imagine, if you will, that
the State of North Carolina had vested exclusive regulatory au-
thority over dentistry in the state’s lawyers. That would solve the
problem of self-interest, but it would still be completely illegitimate,
not as a matter of competition regulation but rather as a matter
of political control in a democratic society.11 
The Court’s error in North Carolina State Board was not a sin-
gular event; it was the natural consequence of how the state action
doctrine has developed over time, and particularly how it has come
to be dominated by the two-prong test the Court announced in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.12
Over time, the Court has become increasingly concerned about the
competitive harms that flow from state regulations that, by virtue
of the state action doctrine, are immune from review under the
federal antitrust laws.13 Although antitrust law is generally con-
sumed with the problem of protecting competition,14 that concern is
misplaced when it comes to the state action doctrine. 
The state action doctrine is not merely unconcerned with com-
petition; the destruction of competition is a fundamental assump-
tion of the state action doctrine. Rather than being concerned about
the likely effects on competition or allocative efficiency (as are most
aspects of modern antitrust doctrine), state action is concerned
about the nature of governmental action. The motives of the
relevant actors, self-interested or otherwise, are irrelevant. North
9. See id. at 1114.
10. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749
(1994).
11. See id.
12. See 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
13. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1113.
14. See Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.”).
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Carolina State Board’s mistaken introduction of those motives into
its state action analysis, while possibly saving us from avaricious
regulators and lobbyists, will only further cloud the application of
the doctrine. The state action doctrine has become increasingly
muddled as the Court has allowed concerns over the competitive
effects of state regulation to push it toward a competition-focused
analysis—the same analysis that led to the confused, self-interest
approach in North Carolina State Board. Recognizing that state
action is a doctrine that represents political rather than economic
values will allow the Court to return to its original conception of
state action, one that fits within a broader, political understanding
of the federal constitutional structure. Resituating state action
within its political dimensions demonstrates the connections be-
tween state action and other politically salient aspects of not only
antitrust law but also constitutional law more generally. Doing so
will not only rationalize state action within antitrust law, but it
will also do so in a way that makes sense in the larger constitutional
order.
This Article proceeds by reviewing the development of the state
action doctrine from its origins in Parker as a doctrine about def-
erence to state regulation through the Court’s adoption of the mod-
ern test for state action in Midcal, tracing the shift away from a
political model of state action that focused on state power toward an
economic one that could be more generally applied. After explaining
how state action operates differently for governmental and non-
governmental entities, this Article returns to North Carolina State
Board to consider it as a matter of first principles. Armed with the
lessons of Parker, this Article considers how a political understand-
ing of state action can work and can connect antitrust to other areas
of law concerned with state power, especially constitutional law.
This Article then considers the implications of this new under-
standing, followed by a brief conclusion.
I. FROM PARKER TO NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD 
If the structure of the Board is indeed so odd from the perspective
of political control, then why did the Court rule on the self-interest
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rationale,15 rather than on the infinitely more intuitive rationale of
the Board’s lack of political legitimacy? When one considers the
origins of the modern state action doctrine, it becomes easier to see
how and why the Court veered far enough off course to adopt the
rule it did in North Carolina State Board. As originally understood,
state action was fundamentally a doctrine about precisely what it
says: the action of states.16 Later, when the Court attempted to
extend the doctrine to private firms, it adopted a test—the two-
element combination of (1) a clearly articulated state policy to
displace competition, and (2) active supervision by the state that has
become closely identified with Midcal.17 That test, which focused on
the economic policy underlying the regulation while requiring active
state supervision in order to avoid the problems of regulatory
capture, effectively hid the political origins of the test and caused
the Court to focus on the economic rather than political conse-
quences of regulation.18 The Court then modified the Midcal test in
order to reapply it to political rather than private actors in Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,19 effectively incorporating the con-
cerns over the economic harms of regulatory capture into state
action writ large, forgetting the political origins of the doctrine in
the process. By the time the Court applied the doctrine in North
Carolina State Board, the Midcal/Hallie framework had completely
subsumed the original political understanding of state action,
causing the Court to worry about problems of regulatory capture
instead of democratic legitimacy.20
A. Putting the State Back in State Action
1. The Parker Era: A State Actor?
Although state action has its canonical origins in Parker v.
Brown,21 that case was originally decided not as an antitrust case
15. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
16. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
17. 445 U.S. at 105.
18. See id. at 105-06.
19. 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985).
20. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1112-14.
21. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567 (1984) (“The starting point in any
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but rather as a constitutional challenge to the California raisin
program22 and was accordingly tried before a three-judge district
court.23 The Supreme Court did not even consider the antitrust
question until the second time Parker was argued.24 
The California scheme was complicated, but the statute was
designed to limit the number of raisins on the market through a
system of marketing rations combined with a “surplus pool” of
reserves.25 The statute authorized the creation of a state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission, which consisted of eight
governor-appointed members who were confirmed by the state
senate along with the state Director of Agriculture serving as an ex
officio member.26 On petition of ten relevant producers, the Commis-
sion would hold a hearing and, after making relevant findings,
would form a “program committee” from “among nominees chosen
by the qualified producers within the zone.”27 That program com-
mittee, in turn, would formulate a “proration marketing program”
that, after approval by both the Commission and 65 percent of the
relevant producers, would then come into force and be administered
by the relevant program committee.28 Brown, aggrieved by the
program, decided to sell raisins in excess of his ration, prompting
state authorities to threaten prosecution.29 He then sued to enjoin
the program’s operation.30
Consequently, although Parker gave birth to the modern doctrine
of state action immunity, the question in Parker was not whether
the State of California, the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commis-
sion, the relevant “program committee,” the raisin farmers, or
Parker (the Director of Agriculture) were liable for violating the
Sherman Act.31 Indeed, the Act went completely unmentioned in the
analysis involving the state-action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown.”).
22. See Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
23. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1943).
24. See id. at 344.
25. Id. at 346-48.
26. Id. at 346.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 347.
29. See id. at 349.
30. Id. at 344.
31. Cf. id.
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district court opinion32 and unargued in the original merits briefs.33
Rather, the question originally before the Court was whether the
California act was unconstitutional.34 On reargument, the Court
added the questions of whether the California act was preempted by
either the Sherman Act or the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937.35 But even in the final case, there was never any ques-
tion that any of the defendants might be liable under the Sherman
Act, and thus no question of their immunity under the state action
doctrine.36
Because Parker was a case about state power as opposed to anti-
trust liability, the Court naturally focused on the interests of the
state. As the Court described the Sherman Act’s effect—or lack
thereof—on the state:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state
or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitu-
tion, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is
not lightly to be attributed to Congress.37
The Court did address the possibility of immunity for private
entities, albeit in the course of explaining that all of the relevant
acts were those of the state.38 The treatment of private immunity
32. See Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941); see also William H. Page,
Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State
Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (1981) (“[T]he Parker
Court did not base its construction of the Sherman Act on legislative history, but instead
derived a presumption of congressional intent from the concept of federalism.”).
33. See generally Brief of Appellee, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (No. 46), 1942
WL 53736; Brief on Behalf of Appellants, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (No. 46), 1942
WL 53737.
34. See Brown, 39 F. Supp. at 896.
35. Parker, 317 U.S. at 344.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 350-51.
38. See id. at 351-52 (“[W]e have no question of the state or its municipality becoming a
participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade.”). The
Court compared the case to Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 451-53
(1941), in which the city of Kansas City, Kansas was alleged to have violated the Elkins Act
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based on the state program was short and stark: There was none.
“[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful.”39
That might initially seem in tension with the state action doc-
trine as we currently understand it. It would be a pretty narrow
doctrine if it only applied to the states themselves. The whole point
of the state action doctrine is to allow private actors to avoid lia-
bility for conduct that would otherwise violate the Sherman Act,
isn’t it?
The answer to that question seems to be “no,” although the Court
has admittedly struggled to articulate it in such simple terms.
During the early development of the Parker doctrine, the Court
drew distinctions specifically based on the identity of the party
engaged in the challenged conduct. Parker itself, with the Court’s
emphasis on the state’s singular role in the restraint, was such a
case.40 But there were others. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., a
plurality of the Court refused to extend Parker immunity to an
electric utility on the singular theory that Parker is limited to state
actors:
Unquestionably the term “state action” may be used broadly to
encompass individual action supported to some extent by state
law or custom. Such a broad use of the term, which is familiar in
civil rights litigation, is not, however, what Mr. Chief Justice
Stone described in his Parker opinion. He carefully selected
language which plainly limited the Court’s holding to official
action taken by state officials.41
Conversely, the next year in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court
distinguished Cantor and identified the supervisory role the Arizona
by effectively providing rebates to railroad customers in exchange for moving their livestock
market to the city. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52.
39. Id. at 351.
40. See id. at 352.
41. 428 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Indeed, the Court’s
emphasis on the private character of the utility prompted Justice Stewart to declare that
Parker immunity would essentially become a nullity, “circumvented by the simple expedient
of suing the private party against whom the State’s ‘anticompetitive’ command runs.” Id. at
616-17 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1404 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1395
Supreme Court wielded over the Arizona State Bar to render the
bar an “agent” of the Supreme Court.42 That agency relationship
made not the bar—but rather the state—the “real party in interest,”
effectively making the claims “against the State” and therefore
immune under Parker.43
The distinction between state and private actors with regard to
a doctrine called “state action” certainly has intuitive appeal, and,
as the Court frequently pointed out, it cannot possibly be the case
that states can immunize private firms from federal antitrust
liability simply by declaring that it is a state policy to do so.44 That
theory would allow the states to confer immunity on state corpora-
tions against any number of federal laws, a nonsensical result.45 
Another way to look at state action is through the lens of con-
duct—the conduct ostensibly protected by the state action. In
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., a Louisiana statute
allowed for enforcement of resale price maintenance agreements
against both signatories and nonsigning distributors so long as the
manufacturer had an agreement with one distributor.46 The Court
held that the state’s enabling of a private vertical price restraint
(which at that time constituted a per se violation, albeit with an
exception for state regulation as to signatories from the Miller-
Tydings Act) essentially “demands private conduct which the
Sherman Act forbids.”47 Similarly, in Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
in which a state statute permitted the enforcement of vertical non-
price restraints against nonsigners, the Court held that the statute
was not preempted but still would not receive state action immu-
nity, as “[t]he manner in which a distiller utilizes the designation
statute and the arrangements a distiller makes with its wholesalers
will be subject to Sherman Act analysis under the rule of reason.”48
42. 433 U.S. 350, 359-61 (1977).
43. Id. at 361-63. 
44. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980)
(“The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak
of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”).
45. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 346 (1904) (“It cannot be said that any
State may give a corporation, created under its laws, authority to restrain interstate or
international commerce against the will of the nation as lawfully expressed by Congress.”).
46. 341 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1951).
47. Id. at 388-89.
48. 458 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1982).
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Thus, in cases where the Court considered the state action to be
the enforcement of discretion exercised by private actors, there was
no state action immunity. But that is simply another way of saying
that the relevant act—the act of discretion—is located in private
rather than public hands. Discussing Schwegmann in Fisher v. City
of Berkeley, Justice Marshall described the discretion retained by
the distributors in Schwegmann as making “it impossible to char-
acterize the regulation as unilateral action by the State of Louisi-
ana.”49 Even if looked at from the perspective of conduct, the focus
was on the identity of the relevant actor engaging in that conduct.
If the body exercising discretion was the state, then state action
immunity applied; if not, then it didn’t.
2. Midcal’s Turn
In 1980, the Court reconsidered the question of when state action
immunity might apply to private actors. In California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., the Court considered a
California law requiring producers to post a “fair trade contract”
specifying a wholesale resale price and then required all wholesalers
in the region to charge no less than that price.50 Essentially, the
statute required minimum resale price maintenance, which was at
the time a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.51 The
scheme did not set resale prices—it left the price setting to the
individual producer and then required all to comply with that resale
price.52 The case arose when the State of California brought an ac-
tion against Midcal for violating the program by selling twenty-
seven cases of Gallo wine at a price below the Gallo Winery’s posted
prices.53 Midcal responded by filing a writ of mandate in the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin operation of the state’s
resale price maintenance program as conflicting with the Sherman
Act.54 
49. 475 U.S. 260, 268 (1986).
50. 445 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1980).
51. Id. at 99-100.
52. Id. at 100.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 758-59 (Ct. App. 1979)
(“[P]etitioner is placed in the untenable position of having to choose to obey possibly
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For the California Court of Appeals, the case was a straightfor-
ward one. The California Supreme Court had recently invalidated
the California program as violating the Sherman Act with regard to
wholesale price maintenance of distilled spirits.55 The only real
question was whether to extend the California Supreme Court’s
ruling from wholesale price maintenance for distilled spirits to retail
price maintenance for wine, which the California Court of Appeals
did, finding the two cases indistinguishable.56 The State was happy
to let that decision stand, but the California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association was not. The Association intervened and brought the
question to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In its survey of the state action case law, Justice Powell’s opinion
discerned “two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v.
Brown. First, the challenged restraint must be one clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, the policy
must be actively supervised by the State itself.”57 This two-pronged
test has become the standard inquiry for state action cases.58 The
Court found the first prong satisfied because the California statute
so clearly required resale price maintenance; the second prong was
not satisfied because state regulators did not oversee the setting of
prices—that was left entirely in private hands.59
That Midcal has become the standard for whether private entities
can receive Parker immunity is quizzical given the nature of the
case. As in Parker (and unlike in North Carolina State Board), the
only action implicating the Sherman Act was an injunction against
the operation of the State regime, not civil or criminal liability for
private entities participating in it.60 Midcal was not an action
against a private entity, nor did any private entity seek Parker
immunity in the case.61 It was an action brought by a private entity
conflicting federal and state laws and face a penalty under the one it chooses to disobey.”).
55. Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 579 P.2d 476, 494-95 (Cal. 1978). 
56. Midcal, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61.
57. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111-12 (2015).
59. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
60. Compare id. at 100, and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1943), with N.C. State
Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1108-09.
61. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 99.
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against the state, and, as in Parker, it was the state, not a private
party, that sought the benefits of the immunity.62
What has generally come to be called the “Midcal” formulation
was not itself a product of Midcal. Midcal cited Justice Brennan’s
plurality opinion in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., a case dealing with state action immunity for a city.63 City of
Lafayette, in turn, cited Bates v. State Bar of Arizona for the
standard,64 even though the Court decided Bates not based on clear
articulation plus active supervision, but rather on the more cat-
egorical basis that the acts ostensibly of the State Bar were in
actuality the acts of the State of Arizona,65 albeit by virtue of the
Arizona Supreme Court’s supervision of those acts.66 
Thus, what has become the standard for private state action
immunity from antitrust liability had its origins in a case about
whether a public actor’s enforcement of a state regulatory scheme
was preempted by the Sherman Act. Moreover, Midcal announced
the new rule, the full dimensions of which were hypothetical be-
cause the rule had not been satisfied in Midcal itself, without any
apparent recognition or intent that it would apply to private rather
than public actors.67 The Court recognized the state statute would
allow conduct by private parties that would otherwise violate the
Sherman Act,68 but it never considered the possibility that those
private parties might be liable for violating the Sherman Act. The
question in the case was whether they had violated the California
liquor distribution statute, not the Sherman Act.69
3. Cities and the Lost Public/Private Distinction
Given their somewhat ambiguous position on the state-private
continuum, cities present a particular problem of classification.
62. See id. at 102-03; Parker, 317 U.S. at 348-51.
63. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion)); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391.
64. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977)).
65. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
66. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 361.
67. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
68. Id. at 103.
69. See id. at 100.
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Cities are neither “private” nor the “state,” forcing the Court to
consider the grey area between those binary extremes. In City of
Lafayette, a plurality of the Court relied on its general understand-
ing of the city versus state distinction to conclude that cities do not
necessarily get Parker immunity the way states do.70 When the
Court decided Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder
in 1982, the Midcal formulation was extant, and the Court consid-
ered the question by applying Midcal to conclude that a general
home-rule grant of authority did not satisfy the clear articulation
element of the inquiry.71
By the time of Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Midcal
test had become a given, and the only question was how Midcal
would apply to a city.72 The Court decided that only the first Midcal
factor—clear articulation—applied to cities, removing the active
supervision requirement.73 Thus in Hallie, the development came
full circle. A rule the Court developed to apply only to public entities
had been advanced to apply to private ones (except it didn’t), and
then the Court modified the rule in order to make sense in the con-
text of a politically accountable entity such as a city. By this point,
though, the underlying inquiry—whether the act could fairly be
attributed to the state—had been lost entirely and had been re-
placed with the Midcal test, albeit modified for cities.74 What was
also lost was any real attempt to ask the question the Court asked
in Parker, or for that matter, that the California Supreme Court
asked in its own cases striking down the California liquor resale
price maintenance regime: whether the resale price maintenance
regime was “a sovereign act of the state so as to exempt it from the
Sherman Act.”75
In addition to finding the active supervision requirement
inapplicable to cities, Hallie adopted what can only be described as
70. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411-13 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
71. See Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-56 (1982).
72. 471 U.S. 34, 39-40 (1985).
73. Id. at 47.
74. See id.
75. Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 579 P.2d 476, 485 (Cal. 1978); see also
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (finding the California liquor board laws valid
because the Sherman Act works only as “a prohibition of individual and not state action”).
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a generous interpretation of “clearly articulat[ed]” as “foreseeable.”76
By the time of FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., which
dealt with a different kind of nonstate public entity with its own
corporate existence distinct from the state (a hospital authority,
which could be organized under Georgia law by a city or by a com-
bination of them77), the state action doctrine had become “dis-
favored, much as are repeals by implication.”78 The Court dialed
back the generosity of its “foreseeability” interpretation of clear
articulation while assuming the hospital authorities to be “akin” to
political subdivisions and therefore also free of the active supervi-
sion requirement.79
Of course, state action immunity is nothing like a “repeal[ ] by
implication”;80 it reflects a decision that regulatory acts of states are
different in kind than acts by private market participants.81 One
might conceive of the immunity as a repeal by implication by ab-
solving private firms of antitrust liability (as FTC v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co., the case the Court quoted in Phoebe Putney, did),82
but not when applying the doctrine to allow the enforcement of state
regulation by public entities. Saying that state action is “disfavored”
even when the act in question is clearly public regulation is a little
like saying that “federalism is disfavored.”
Phoebe Putney’s failure to recognize the fundamentally different
effects of state action on public as opposed to private entities is a
direct consequence of Midcal’s unwitting conflation of the treatment
of private and public entities. The result has been the loss of any
real connection between “state action immunity” and actual state
action.83
Between Parker and North Carolina State Board, there was only
one case in which the Court extended immunity to an act involving
agreement by private firms and not otherwise expressly authorized
76. See 471 U.S. at 42-43.
77. See 568 U.S. 216, 220 (2013).
78. Id. at 225 (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)).
79. Id. at 226 n.5, 226-28.
80. Id. at 225.
81. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
82. See Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 638-40.
83. Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 225 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)).
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by federal statute:84 the collective ratemaking at the heart of
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States.85
Southern Motor Carriers pertained to the setting of rates for
intrastate truck transportation in a number of states.86 The carriers
used joint rate bureaus in order to collectively propose uniform
rates, which state public utility commissions then approved.87 In the
context of rejecting an “inflexible ‘compulsion requirement’” in favor
of the Midcal two-pronged test,88 the Court held that the carriers
were immune from antitrust scrutiny.89 But it is important to note
not only that the Court’s ruling was limited to the compulsion
requirement90 but also that the government conceded the active
supervision element in Southern Motor Carriers.91 Seven years later,
in Ticor Title, the approval of rates by state commissions without
meaningful review was itself rejected for failing to satisfy the active
supervision requirement92 conceded in Southern Motor Carriers,93
leaving considerable doubt whether the rule of Southern Motor
Carriers has any practical applicability at all. 
In the end, the only real work that Parker immunity seems to do
is for public entities—albeit ones that do not rise to the status of the
state itself—including the cities in City of Lafayette, Community
Communications, and Hallie, and the hospital authority in Phoebe
Putney.94 But the one thing that most completely determines
84. E.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (2012)); Reed-Bulwinkle Act, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (current version at 49
U.S.C. § 10706 (2012)); Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1940)) (repealed 1975).
85. 471 U.S. 48, 66 (1985).
86. Id. at 50.
87. Id. at 52. The carriers were free to deviate from the joint rates and submit an
independent rate proposal to the relevant state commission. Id.
88. Id. at 62.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id. at 62. But see id. at 61 (“[W]e hold Midcal’s two-pronged test applicable to private
parties’ claims of state action immunity.”).
91. Id. at 62.
92. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992).
93. Id. at 639 (citing Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62, 66) (noting that supervision
had been conceded in Southern Motor Carriers and that the Court had undertaken “no real
examination of the active supervision aspect of the case”).
94. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225 (2013); Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40, 50-51 (1982) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13
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whether (and the degree to which) an entity benefits from Parker
immunity is its degree of identity with the state.95 Thus, when
Justice Scalia had to describe the state action doctrine in City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., he correctly distin-
guished private action, and described Parker exclusively as an
immunity of the state.96
Midcal represented a break in the development of state action
immunity, even if it was, as I would argue, a somewhat inadvertent
one. Decided at a time when antitrust scholars and judges were de-
veloping a more sophisticated understanding about the economics
of regulation,97 Midcal focused on the potential problems inherent
in regulation, such as regulatory capture, and problems of agency
between states and private parties when the state had adopted
anticompetitive policies for one reason, but the private actors would
use those anticompetitive policies for their own financial gain.98 In
so doing, the Court shifted the inquiry away from the previous focus
on whether an act could rightly be attributed to the state99 and
replaced it with an artificial inquiry that came to dominate state
action cases, even as the Court discovered that one half of it (the
active supervision requirement) should not apply to any entity ac-
tually covered by the doctrine.100
(1978) (plurality opinion); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416.
95. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 228.
96. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991) (“While
Parker recognized the States’ freedom to engage in anticompetitive regulation, it did not
purport to immunize from antitrust liability the private parties who urge them to engage in
anticompetitive regulation.”). 
97. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 27 (1983); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 723-28 (1986).
98. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1980).
99. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
100. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
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B. The Antitrust Ecosystem of Political Immunities
1. Protections for Private Parties
If the core of Parker immunity is the public nature of the recipient
of the immunity, what then of private actors subject to state
anticompetitive regulation? After all, it seems unfair (as posed by
the California Court of Appeals in Midcal) to hold private parties
liable under the federal antitrust laws if they are compelled to
violate those laws by inconsistent state regulation.101 There is an
answer for those private parties, but it does not come from Parker.
The first way private parties might avoid antitrust liability by
virtue of compliance with conflicting state law is substantive—by
failing to enter into an agreement to restrain competition. Fisher v.
City of Berkeley involved a rent-control ordinance adopted by the
city council of Berkeley, California.102 A group of landlords, recog-
nizing that the ordinance was necessarily restraining rents below
competitive levels, sued, arguing (among other things) that the
ordinance was preempted by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.103 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, did not see how the
ordinance could be preempted because he did not see any conflict
between the ordinance and Section 1.104 Of course, the ordinance
affected competition—indeed, its restraint on prices would consti-
tute a per se violation if implemented by the landlords them-
selves.105 But more than an anticompetitive effect is necessary for a
Section 1 violation; that effect must be the product of a “contract,
combination ..., or conspiracy.”106 As understood by the Court, reg-
ulatory mandates of the state are unilaterally imposed, and as such
they lack the element of agreement necessary for a Section 1
violation.107
101. See Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760-61 (Ct. App. 1979).
102. 475 U.S. 260, 261-62 (1986).
103. See id. at 264.
104. Id. at 270.
105. Id. at 266.
106. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Fisher, 475 U.S. at 266
(quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).
107. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267; see United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306 (1919). 
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For private parties simply complying with mandatory state
regulation, there is no potential for Section 1 liability because there
is no agreement.108 Many of the early cases approached the state
action doctrine from just this angle, looking for state compulsion as
an essential ingredient of a state action defense.109 But from the
perspective of private defendants, the better approach is Justice
Marshall’s.
But what of parties who do agree—who might even seek out and
either band together to obtain anticompetitive state regulation or
conspire with the government to obtain it? They cannot benefit from
Fisher because they agreed.110 For those private parties, antitrust
provides a different but related immunity, one the Court developed
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.111 and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.112 The
Noerr/Pennington doctrine protects action, even concerted action,
directed at government officials to obtain regulation that produces
anticompetitive advantages, and it stems from the recognition that
virtually all lobbying efforts seek regulation that will harm
competition in some way.113 As Justice Scalia explained in City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Noerr/Pennington
doctrine recognizes that “the antitrust laws, ‘tailored as they are for
the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the
political arena.’”114 
Omni Outdoor demonstrates just how broad Noerr/Pennington
immunity is, and how it works with Parker immunity. Omni, a
billboard company seeking to enter the billboard market in Colum-
bia, South Carolina, alleged a conspiracy between a dominant
market incumbent (Columbia Outdoor) and members of the Colum-
bia city council.115 The scheme allegedly involved meetings between
the incumbent and city council members covered over by a series
108. See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267.
109. See id.; City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 414 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
110. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
111. 365 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1961).
112. 381 U.S. 657, 671 (1965).
113. See id.; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144-45; Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 23 (“Regulation
displaces competition. Displacement is the purpose, indeed the definition, of regulation.”).
114. 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141).
115. Id. at 368.
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of public hearings held in bad faith, leading the city to adopt zoning
ordinances and other billboard regulations designed to prevent
Omni from entering the market and to protect the monopoly po-
sition of the market incumbent.116 The Court found that the firm’s
conduct was protected under Noerr/Pennington and posited it would
be protected even if the firm had obtained the regulation through an
act of conspiracy—an antitrust favorite—or some other wrongful or
illegal act.117
The Court drew the connection to Parker explicitly, highlighting
the different application of the two doctrines: “As we have described,
Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle
that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics; the former
decision protects the States’ acts of governing, and the latter the
citizen’s participation in government.”118 Just as public entities can
avail themselves of state action immunity for their regulatory acts,
private entities are protected either by their lack of agreement un-
der Fisher,119 or more generally, by the intervening regulatory act
under Noerr/Pennington.120 The doctrines fit together just that close-
ly, one respecting the state’s role in government and the other re-
specting the citizen’s. 
2. Fitting the Pieces Together
How do these sets of immunities and protections work together?
It depends on who the relevant actor is. If the relevant actor is a
governmental entity but not the state itself (such as a municipality),
then there is limited state action immunity based on the connection
between the regulation and the state, either under Midcal/Hallie121
or by application of the earlier state action cases seeking to connect
the regulation to the state, such as Bates.122 If the relevant actor is
116. See id.
117. See id. at 383-84.
118. Id. at 383.
119. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986).
120. Omni Outdoor, 499 U.S. at 383-84; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 671 (1965); see E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 144-45 (1961).
121. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985); Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980).
122. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 362-63 (1977).
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not a governmental entity, then state action immunity is not
available, but two other approaches are available: either the lack of
agreement defense under Fisher123 or, if there is agreement, the
defense under Noerr/Pennington.124
Private parties do have a role in state action cases, but it’s not by
receiving immunity from antitrust liability. In true state action
cases such as Parker, the private party doesn’t have antitrust lia-
bility because its act is not a violation of the Sherman Act but rather
is a violation of the state regime.125 The private party’s violation is
by virtue of their insistence on hewing toward competitive markets,
such as when Brown sold his raisins in defiance of the ration pro-
gram—conduct that cannot possibly violate the Sherman Act.126
Rather, the private party has likely violated the relevant state law,
and it is not seeking immunity; instead, it is seeking an injunction
against the state law’s enforcement, which is a form of preemp-
tion.127 In order for state action immunity to be on the table, the
relevant actor has to be a governmental actor, which brings us back
to the real question at issue in North Carolina State Board.128
C. Applying Parker (and the Lessons of Midcal) to North Carolina
State Board
With this fresh perspective, we can approach North Carolina
State Board from the first principles of state action rather than by
attempting to apply the narrow Midcal test of clearly articulated
policy and active state supervision.
What can we draw from this? 
As between the majority and dissent in North Carolina State
Board, it seems the dissent came closer to asking the right question:
Is the Board the state?129 As the cases demonstrate, the availability
123. 475 U.S. at 267.
124. Omni Outdoor, 499 U.S. at 383-84; see Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671; Noerr, 365 U.S.
at 144-45.
125. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
126. See id. at 349, 352.
127. See id. at 352.
128. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
129. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117-18 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
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of Parker immunity depends largely on where the actor falls on the
private-state continuum, which ranges from purely private actors
getting essentially no immunity to states themselves having broad
immunity.130
That is not to say that Justice Alito took the right approach to
answering that question. According to him, North Carolina’s
definition of the agency as a state agency, combined with finding the
regulation of dentistry to be a matter of public health and granting
the Board the power to make regulations and to sue in the name of
North Carolina, should have been adequate to make it a state actor
for immunity purposes.131 Although he was careful to cite Parker’s
own limits on state conferrals of immunity and Northern Secu-
rities132 to distinguish the North Carolina law from a simple grant
of immunity to a private company, it is not clear how successfully he
did so, unless it is the case that the State of North Carolina can
designate anyone it wants to promulgate regulations and sue in its
name. It cannot possibly be up to the government of North Carolina
to decide, unilaterally and on its own terms, whether an agent’s acts
are its own for the purposes of state action immunity. If it were,
then North Carolina could effectively bestow federal antitrust
immunity on any private corporation by proclamation, the precise
result rejected by both Parker133 and Northern Securities.134
The majority rejected Justice Alito’s approach by pointing to the
potential for conflicts of interest caused by the board members
participating in the industry they are regulating.135 That argument
is essentially the converse of a justification advanced in Hallie for
not applying the active supervision requirement to cities.136 The
Court justified allowing cities to avoid the active supervision re-
quirement because “[w]e may presume, absent a showing to the
contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest. A private
130. See supra Part I.B.2.
131. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1119-20 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
132. See id. at 1120.
133. See supra text accompanying note 41.
134. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 346 (1904).
135. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1113-14 (majority opinion).
136. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45-46 (1985).
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party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily
on his or its own behalf.”137
That statement is false, or at least comically naïve, given not only
the extensive scholarship on the political economics of regulation,138
but also the Court’s own precedent. In City of Lafayette, the Court
took a somewhat more realistic view of the incentives of cities:
Every business enterprise, public or private, operates its
business in furtherance of its own goals. In the case of a munici-
pally owned utility, that goal is likely to be, broadly speaking,
the benefit of its citizens. But the economic choices made by
public corporations in the conduct of their business affairs,
designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for the
community constituency, are not inherently more likely to
comport with the broader interests of national economic well-
being than are those of private corporations acting in further-
ance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders.139
Whether cities (or other political subdivisions of states) have
incentives to serve the public interest varies by circumstance. Some
cities use profits from money-making activities to subsidize others,
creating an incentive to charge profit-maximizing prices identical to
those of private firms.140 The incentives might even depend on the
particular restraint at issue. The restraints in both City of Lafayette
and Hallie involved the potential to leverage the city’s monopoly
power within its own jurisdiction into markets where the city was
not politically accountable.141 In cases such as those, where fiscal in-
centives match poorly with political accountability, there is little
137. Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
138. E.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
139. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 403 (1978) (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 418-19 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“This case turns, or ought to, on the
District Court’s explicit conclusion, unchallenged here, that ‘[t]hese plaintiff cities are
engaging in what is clearly a business activity; activity in which a profit is realized’.... There
is nothing in this record to support any assumption other than that this is an ordinary dispute
among competitors in the same market.” (footnote omitted)).
140. See, e.g., Hallie, 471 U.S. at 37.
141. In City of Lafayette, it was competition among customers outside the relevant cities’
boundaries, 435 U.S. at 391-92; in Hallie, it was an attempt to tie sewage collection and
transportation services to sewerage treatment services for residents outside the city limits,
471 U.S. at 37.
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reason to believe that the city’s “public-service” orientation is likely
to do much work.142 Indeed, strong forces will push the other way:
toward shifting financial burdens onto parties to whom the cities
are not politically accountable.143 Since the city’s political currency
is denominated in votes rather than in dollars, it has every incentive
to financially benefit its voters at the expense of nonconstituents in
the hope that protecting its constituents’ pocketbooks will result in
increased political support.144 In that regard, cities are considerably
more dangerous than private firms, which cannot similarly arbi-
trage financial gains into political capital.
What is even more troubling is that the majority appeared to
determine that the Board was not the state because the members of
the Board were self-interested.145 In so doing, the Court effectively
took a justification for not applying the active supervision require-
ment and stood it on its head to make it the sine qua non of state
action immunity.146 In this way, the Court worked backwards from
the harm it perceived antitrust laws seek to prevent to formulate a
rule for when a particular entity is, for purposes of antitrust law, a
state actor.147 By focusing too much on the possibility of an economic
harm stemming from self-dealing, the Court ignored the real ques-
tion presented by the case: whether (or to what degree) the Board
was the state.148 That is a question that has to be answered with
reference to political, not competitive, values.
142. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403 (“[T]he economic choices made by public
corporations in the conduct of their business affairs, designed as they are to assure maximum
benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are those of private corporations acting
in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its shareholders.”).
143. Such “representation reinforcement” concerns are the justification for much of the
constitutional law of both vertical, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433
(1819), and horizontal federalism, see S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177, 184-85 n.2 (1938). 
144. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-04.
145. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1113-14 (2015).
146. See id. at 1114, 1117.
147. See id. at 1114, 1116-17.
148. See id. at 1111, 1117; see also id. at 1117 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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II. THE POLITICS OF STATE ACTION
So, if Justice Alito asked the right question but answered it
incorrectly, and the majority asked the wrong question altogether,
then what should the Court have done? As suggested above, the
right answer does not come from the likely harm to competition,
since enabling harm to competition is the objective of the state
action immunity.149 The answers come from political constitutional
values, ones whose distinctions are notoriously difficult to identify
at the margins. While I will explore some of those margins, North
Carolina State Board itself does not come close to any of them—it
is a constitutional, if not an antitrust, no-brainer.
A. Taking off Antitrust Blinders
Were it not for the Midcal/Hallie combination of cases,150 it would
be hard to imagine anyone approaching the question of whether the
Board was a state actor the way the Court did;151 the structure of
the antitrust state action inquiry is at least slightly odd. Singularly
focused on competition (a specific field of regulation) and immunity
(rather than power or liability), the state action doctrine does not
generalize well to other areas. For example, if the state had a policy
of encouraging self-help and implemented it by giving all applicants
police badges without training or supervision, I think we would all
still attribute those new officers’ acts to the state, the likely self-
interest of the new officers notwithstanding. The doctrine is even
more specific after North Carolina State Board, with its additional
dimension of self-interest. Conflicts of interest are important—their
presence can invalidate state action by violating rights of due pro-
cess152—but they do not generally alter the identity of the conflicted
actor. A judge with a conflict of interest is a judge, even if her
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985); Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1980).
151. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111-12 (2015).
152. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927).
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rulings might be deficient—even constitutionally deficient—because
of the presence of a conflict.153
Rather, we generally identify state actors because they occupy a
constitutional or statutory office.154 In the end, all state actors in the
United States are politically accountable to the electorate.155 This is
true even of federal judges, who, although they have life tenure, are
appointed, confirmed, and potentially removed by elected officials.156
This is not true of the Board, which, even if it occupies a statutory
office, is not accountable to the people of North Carolina.157 Rather,
six of the eight members of the Board are accountable only to the
dentists (and one to the dental hygienists) of North Carolina.158 The
“consumer” member of the Board is appointed by the governor and
so is at least ultimately accountable to the electorate.159 The lack of
any real political accountability to the electorate—not just that it is
made up largely of dentists—is the real problem with the Board,160
and it is a problem not limited to antitrust.161 When one considers
the restrictions on the dental franchise, the professional require-
ments for membership on the Board seem comparatively unprob-
lematic. Imagine, for instance, a requirement that anyone being
appointed or elected to a judgeship be a licensed attorney.162 So long
as the office remains politically accountable, such an occupational
limitation seems to be not just acceptable but maybe even a good
idea. 
153. Cf. id.
154. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (noting that the inquiry to
determine if someone is a state actor is “whether the ... conduct is fairly attributable to the
State”).
155. See Amar, supra note 10, at 749.
156. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 4, art. III, § 1.
157. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Page, supra note 32, at 1103 (“[S]tate action that adversely affects individuals who
do not have access to ordinary modes of political redress merits a lesser degree of deference.”).
161. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1973) (invalidating administrative
action of state licensing based on conflict of interest as a matter of due process).
162. See Matt Ford, When Your Judge Isn't a Lawyer, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/when-your-judge-isnt-a-lawyer/515568/ [https://
perma.cc/AN3F-DFUP] (pointing out that twenty-eight states require all criminal judges to
be lawyers and considering states that allow any nonlawyer judges to be “troubling”).
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It does not take much imagination to see the real problem here.
As suggested above, it seems problematic to limit the electorate for
the Board to the self-interested dentists, but it would be equally (if
not more)163 problematic to limit the right to vote for dental reg-
ulators to any professional group, including one without a conflict
of interest, such as the state’s licensed attorneys. Professional limits
on the franchise are essentially unheard of in the United States.
The history of voting in the United States is hardly one of universal
suffrage, with the franchise gradually expanding as to race,164 then
as to sex,165 and finally as to wealth,166 but there is no apparent
history of limiting it on the basis of one’s profession.167 One has to
travel back to the mercantilist economic order of England and
control of the economy by the various livery companies to find
meaningful voting limits based on profession.168 
The converse, of course, is also true. If North Carolina had an
open, statewide election for the Board, and the people of North
Carolina elected a board consisting entirely of practicing dentists,
then it would be hard to see any objection. In the U.S. constitutional
order, democracy generally provides its own justification for reg-
ulation, subject to only the mildest form of substantive review so
long as there is no reason to think political processes have been
systemically subverted or higher order constitutional rights are
implicated.169 Indeed, the imposition of a federal statutory scheme
to control the exercise of such electoral power by North Carolina
163. At least there is a rational basis for believing that dentists are well-suited to
governing the practice of dentistry. The same cannot be said for lawyers. The lawyers’ lack
of a conflict of interest seems somewhat outweighed by their lack of an understanding of
dentistry. 
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
166. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
167. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965) (striking down as unconstitutional
a prohibition on voting by members of the U.S. military who moved to Texas). The Court later
identified the standard applied in Carrington for limiting the franchise on the basis of
membership in the military as requiring a “compelling state interest.” See Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (citing Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96).
168. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91
VA. L. REV. 1313, 1320-21 (2005).
169. Cf. Page, supra note 32, at 1103 (“The popular consent which authorizes state
regulation enacted through the democratic process justifies the Court’s deferential approach,
and, so long as this process is available, a wide range of regulatory legislation is permissible.”
(footnote omitted)).
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would raise substantial constitutional concerns. The States, not the
federal government, are constitutionally assigned the responsibili-
ty and power to regulate their elections,170 and federal interference
with that power is “far from ordinary.”171 Federalism was the
lynchpin of Justice Alito’s dissent—and even if one disagrees with
his approach to resolving this dispute between the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and North Carolina, he did recognize the case for
what it is: an attempt by federal authorities to control how the
people of North Carolina delegate regulatory authority within the
State.172 The first part of Midcal requires that the state’s anti-
competitive policy is clearly expressed173 (which was conceded in this
case174), and if the people of North Carolina want their dental ser-
vices run by dentists, then who is the FTC, or the Sherman Act, to
say otherwise?
When viewed as a matter of political legitimacy, the economic
interests of the Board, which served as the lynchpin of the Court’s
decision in North Carolina State Board,175 are not relevant to any
part of this analysis. This irrelevance works both ways. The lack of
a financial interest would not make the dentists (or our notional
lawyers) the state for purposes of the state action doctrine (or, for
that matter, for any purpose whatsoever).176 Conversely, if the
Board is the state, then the financial interests of its members would
not be relevant to the antitrust analysis, just as the potentially
illicit interests of the city council members were rendered legally
irrelevant by the decision in Omni Outdoor.177 Regulators frequently
benefit from regulation, and even in the context of state action
170. Carrington, 380 U.S. at 91. 
171. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013).
172. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“Today, however, the Court takes the unprecedented step of holding that Parker
does not apply to the North Carolina Board because the Board is not structured in a way that
merits a good-government seal of approval.”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 28
(describing the shift in Midcal toward federal prescription of state regulatory processes in
order to avoid capture); Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections
on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 335 (1975) (describing the close relationship
between narrow state action immunity and aggressive substantive due process review).
173. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
174. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
175. See id. at 1114.
176. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
177. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383-84 (1991).
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immunity, the Court has refused to re-label state action as nonstate
action by virtue of that self-interest.178 As a plurality of the Court
said in City of Lafayette when describing the incentives of the
Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,179 “[w]e think
it obvious that the fact that the ancillary effect of the State Bar’s
policy, or even the conscious desire on its part, may have been to
benefit the lawyers it regulated cannot transmute the State Bar’s
official actions into those of a private organization.”180 It seems
unobjectionable for North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper, a licensed
attorney,181 to participate in actions that affect competition in legal
markets, although Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest the contrary
at the end of North Carolina State Board when he asserted (without
citation or analysis) that “the state supervisor may not itself be an
active market participant.”182 Taken seriously, Justice Kennedy’s
assertion would require a census of the professions and real estate
holdings of any legislature that engaged in regulation that limited
competition (which is to say virtually all regulation), exactly the
kind of inquiry the Court rejected in City of Lafayette183 and Omni
Outdoor.184
The question in North Carolina State Board was whether the
Board was the state,185 which is a question of political, not competi-
tive, or even economic, import. Justice Alito criticized the majority
approach for “complicating” the question by introducing the ques-
tion of conflicts of interest,186 but the real problem with the majority
approach was not its complexity, but rather its replacement of po-
litical concerns with financial ones. What makes the Board problem-
atic is not that its members are financially interested; the problem
178. See id.
179. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
180. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.41 (1978) (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 412 n.41 (“Government is not partly public or partly private,
depending upon the governmental pedigree of the type of a particular activity or the manner
in which the Government conducts it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
181. Roy Cooper, N.C. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, https://governor.nc.gov/about-first-family/
roy-cooper [https://perma.cc/8HPW-BUVF].
182. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015).
183. 435 U.S. at 411-12 n.41 (plurality opinion).
184. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383-84 (1991).
185. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1111.
186. See id. at 1117-18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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is that (contrary to North Carolina’s assertion187) they are not, by
any reasonable measure, “the state.” It is the limitation on account-
ability, not the conflict of interest, that renders the office problem-
atic, and that limitation on accountability is a political, not a
competitive or an economic, harm. The narrow, competition-focused
approach of Midcal/Hallie188 focused the Court on the potential for
competitive or economic harm, causing it to miss a much more
general, and obvious, political one.
B. A Constitutional State Action Doctrine
If the state action doctrine truly is grounded in federalism—a
commonplace for the majority and dissent in North Carolina State
Board189—one would think that the primary answers regarding the
Board’s power would be determined as a matter of constitutional,
not antitrust, law. By regulating, the Board seeks to control the
property and liberty of others.190 The Board makes rules—rules that
apply not only to its dentist members (who, if they agreed to it,
would be members of a conspiracy) but also to nondentists, includ-
ing both the dentists’ patients and other people seeking to perform
dental-related services, such as the teeth whitening at issue in
North Carolina State Board.191 Normally, only governments are
allowed to engage in regulation.192 The question, then, is whether
the North Carolina State Board qualifies as a governmental entity
under the constitutional structure for which the Court designed
Parker immunity. There are at least two different ways to ask that
question, neither of which calls upon the Midcal/Hallie structure
187. See id. at 1109 (majority opinion).
188. See supra note 149.
189. Compare N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1110 (“[Parker v. Brown] recognized Congress’[s]
purpose to respect the federal balance and to ‘embody in the Sherman Act the federalism
principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our
Constitution.’” (quoting Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982))), with
id. at 1119 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Instead, the Court reasoned that ‘[i]n a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress
may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.’” (quoting Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (alteration in original))).
190. See id. at 1107-08 (majority opinion).
191. See id.
192. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 69 (2013).
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that has come to dominate the law of antitrust state action immu-
nity. 
1. State Action and Nondelegation
As suggested above, the most straightforward response to Justice
Alito’s claim that the Board is the State of North Carolina is that it
is not. The question then, is what are the consequences of that
conclusion? Under antitrust law, the consequence is that the active
supervision requirement applies, per Hallie,193 and the Board be-
comes potentially liable for violating the antitrust laws.194 Under
constitutional law, the consequence is that the Board’s regulation is
invalid. 
The rule that private entities may not regulate is an unfailing, if
infrequently invoked (if only because it is so widely accepted), rule
of constitutional law.195 In a series of cases prompted by New Deal
legislation that pushed the regulation of the economy toward
industry participants in order to garner stability (and generally
higher prices), the Court uniformly rejected congressional dele-
gations of regulatory authority to private groups.196 In the famous
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States case, the Court
avoided confronting the question by asserting its improbability:
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate
its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or
groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be
wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their
trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or
groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because
such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of
their enterprises? ... Such a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the consti-
tutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.197
193. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985).
194. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
195. See Nachbar, supra note 168, at 1368-69.
196. See Nachbar, supra note 192, at 82-88 (discussing cases).
197. 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); see also id. at 529 (“[T]he statutory plan is not simply one
for voluntary effort. It does not seek merely to endow voluntary trade or industrial
associations or groups with privileges or immunities. It involves the coercive exercise of the
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When the Court was forced to confront the question a few years
later in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., which dealt with a similar
industry-code regime, it confirmed what it suggested in Schechter
Poultry: 
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to
regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delega-
tion to an official or an official body, presumptively disinter-
ested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others in the same business....
And a statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes
an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal
liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly
arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unneces-
sary to do more than refer to decisions of this court which
foreclose the question.198
What eventually saved these schemes was, as was the case in
Parker,199 the interposition of a government actor between the
private body and the promulgation of regulations. In Currin v.
Wallace, the Court dealt with a scheme that allowed the Secretary
of Commerce to designate particular markets and set tobacco
inspection and grading rules for those specific markets, but required
a two-thirds majority of the tobacco growers in the market to
support the designation.200 The Court allowed the regulation, cast-
ing it as regulation by Congress (through the Secretary), albeit
conditional on some future private action (the growers’ approval).201
In Parker, the Court applied an identical analysis to the raisin
growers’ ratification, citing Currin for the rule.202 It should be of
little surprise that antitrust’s state action doctrine, originating as
it did in a case challenging the constitutionality of a state statute,
law-making power. The codes of fair competition which the statute attempts to authorize are
codes of laws.”).
198. 298 U.S. 238, 311-12 (1936) (citing Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537).
199. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
200. 306 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1939).
201. See id. at 15-18.
202. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 (citing Currin, 306 U.S. at 16). 
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contains such strong parallels to the constitutional law of private
regulation. The only real difference between the doctrines is one of
consequence. In the constitutional domain, the consequence is the
invalidity of the regulation;203 in antitrust, the consequence is
immunity from liability under the Sherman Act.204
But either doctrine could be used to produce both consequences.
That is clear from the state action cases themselves, many of which
sound not in immunity but rather in preemption. In addition to
Parker, there are Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,205 Fisher v. City of
Berkeley,206 and even the origin of the modern state action test,
Midcal itself, in which parties sought an injunction to prevent the
operation of the resale price maintenance system.207 Indeed, it is
inherent in many state action cases that the outcome will be one of
two extremes: either (1) the state regulatory regime receives state
action immunity, in which case not only is the regime immune from
antitrust liability, but it also can be enforced against the opposing
party; or (2) the defense fails, and not only does the ostensible
beneficiary of the state regime lose the benefit of the regime, but its
participation in it also potentially becomes an antitrust violation.
The dentists of North Carolina (perhaps all of them, but, at the very
least, the Board members) have not only lost the ability to exclude
nondentists from offering teeth whitening, but they also are
antitrust violators for having conspired to do so (or so the FTC
alleged).208 When you play the game of state action, you win209 or you
expose yourself to treble damages.210 There is no middle ground.211
Recognizing the connection between state action and the private
delegation cases does not, unfortunately, end our inquiry but rather
begins it. The margins of private nondelegation (to whom may the
state delegate?) have not been explored, which is unsurprising given
203. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 311.
204. See, e.g., Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
205. 458 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1982).
206. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
207. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99-100
(1980).
208. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 75, 222, 226, 228-29 (2011). 
209. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
211. Cf. GEORGE R. R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES 408 (1996) (with apologies).
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the paucity of the cases. It is not an easy inquiry.212 Notably, the
Court has failed to come up with a singular test for who is and is not
a state actor in the Parker context. Instead the Court developed the
Midcal test and otherwise relied on either conclusory statements (as
in North Carolina State Board213) or confusing ones,214 despite
having had many opportunities to devise a test. 
2. State Action and “State Action”
Another approach to antitrust’s state action problem comes from
the appropriately named constitutional “state action” doctrine: that
most constitutional limitations apply only to governmental acts.215
That doctrine asks a similar question—when is an act that of the
state—albeit for purposes of imposing liability rather than for
immunizing it.216 Like the antitrust state action doctrine, the con-
stitutional state action doctrine presents a similar dichotomy of
liability: state action is frequently a defense to state law claims,217
but it subjects one to federal constitutional scrutiny.218
The constitutional state action doctrine is unlikely to bring
instant clarity to the antitrust state action doctrine. Offering the
212. See, e.g., Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469-
70 (Tex. 1997).
213. The Court’s examination of whether the Board qualified as a state actor consisted of
the following three circular sentences:
But while the Sherman Act confers immunity on the States’ own anticompetitive
policies out of respect for federalism, it does not always confer immunity where,
as here, a State delegates control over a market to a non-sovereign actor.... For
purposes of Parker, a nonsovereign actor is one whose conduct does not
automatically qualify as that of the sovereign State itself.... State agencies are
not simply by their governmental character sovereign actors for purposes of
state-action immunity.
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110-11 (2015) (internal citations
omitted). The Court then entered into the conflict of interest analysis that produced the rule
of North Carolina State Board. See id. at 1111-12.
214. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (describing the Virginia
State Bar as a “state agency for some limited purposes” without identifying either the limits
or the purposes).
215. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883).
216. See id.
217. For instance, it is because police officers are state actors that they are immune from
prosecution for assault when they subdue suspects. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821
F.3d 697, 708 (6th Cir. 2016).
218. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-11.
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constitutional law of state action as an aid to the antitrust state
action doctrine is a bit like throwing an anvil to a struggling swim-
mer. Practically no area of constitutional law is more vexing than
the state action doctrine; it is a field pockmarked with impondera-
bles and circular reasoning, from Shelley v. Kraemer, which held
that judicial enforcement of a land covenant was sufficient to con-
stitute state action219 (a position that, if applied generally, would
render every contract state action), to Marsh v. Alabama, which
held that the First Amendment could be enforced on privately own-
ed land because it was being operated as a “town,”220 which is about
as helpful as Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity in Jacobellis
v. Ohio.221 The point is not that constitutional state action has the
answers; instead, the doctrine—like the private nondelegation doc-
trine—is asking the same question and for similar purposes: When
should we consider a particular act to be one of the state, and why?
3. A Federal Standard
Although incorporating considerations of private nondelegation
and constitutional state action law may not lead to instant clarity
in the antitrust state action cases, it does make it clear that
whatever standard is adopted for determining whether a particular
act is attributable to the state must be a federal, not a state,
standard.222 That was not a matter of much dispute prior to North
Carolina State Board,223 but Justice Alito’s assertion of federalism
as a justification for accepting North Carolina’s characterization of
the Board at least makes it a point of contention.224 Just as in the
219. 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948).
220. 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946). Notably, Justice Vinson, who authored Shelley, see 344 U.S.
at 4, dissented from Marsh two years later, see 326 U.S. at 517 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting),
suggesting some discontinuity as to the reasoning between the two cases.
221. See 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).
222. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 346 (1904).
223. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985) (“[T]he State may not
validate a municipality’s anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be lawful.”).
224. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1119-20, 1123 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
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constitutional cases, the values at issue in antitrust state action are
federal values, and they require a federal standard to determine
whether they are being served. While that standard might provide
deference to state determinations, it cannot plausibly delegate the
whole determination to the states while still serving those values.
Just as the test for whether a state adjudicator has an impermissi-
ble conflict of interest that renders its decision a violation of federal
due process protections is federal,225 so must be the test for when a
state acts in a way that abrogates application of the federal
antitrust laws.
4. Problems of an Economic Solution to a Political Problem
Taking the constitutional dimensions of Parker immunity
seriously also highlights problems with the economic approach
offered by the Court in North Carolina State Board. As the Court
has modified the state action doctrine over the years to incorporate
more economic thinking, it has taken the doctrine further from its
political roots.226 That shift has consequences. What if the dentists
(or our notional lawyers) could prove that they had actually landed
on optimal regulation? What if, for instance, only retired dentists
could sit on and vote for the Board, thereby decreasing the likeli-
hood of self-interested regulation? If the Board remained controlled
by the state’s dentists but we could show that they have consistently
produced economically optimal regulation, then should we all be
happy? That would effectively make state action cases matters of
presumption, with self-interested boards eligible for immunity if
they could show that they have been producing economically
optimal regulation. That approach seems problematic from both
sides. Such a detailed showing hardly deserves the name “immu-
nity,” and I doubt the FTC would be satisfied with conditioning
state action immunity on such a case-by-case, regulation-by-
regulation analysis. If there really is a problem with the Board’s
225. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (“It is sufficiently clear from our
cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate
these disputes.”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514-15 (1927).
226. See supra Part II.A.
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makeup, then the likelihood that it will produce optimal regulation
should be irrelevant.
Even if the Court and the FTC, each with its own conception of
what qualifies as optimal regulation, may be comfortable to move in
that direction, we should be hesitant to do so. If the purpose of reg-
ulation is to displace competition,227 evaluating whether something
qualifies as regulation by measuring its likelihood to produce out-
comes that mirror competitive ones is likely to miss the point. The
Court has been explicit on this point, readily acknowledging the
tension between the competitive harms wrought by state regulation
and the competitive designs of the Sherman Act, relying instead on
state sovereignty as the justification for state action immunity. As
the Court explained in Ticor Title, “Immunity is conferred out of
respect for ongoing regulation by the State, not out of respect for the
economics of price restraint.”228
III. THE WAY FORWARD
Having condemned the Court’s approach in North Carolina State
Board, it behooves me to at least briefly explore the implications of
adopting a different approach. There are at least four approaches—
two obvious and two perhaps less so.
A. Toward Antitrust Accountability 
The most obvious implication of my analysis (at least I hope), is
that the Midcal/Hallie framework is a poor fit for the principles
underlying the state action doctrine. State action is designed to
allow republican principles of democratic government operating at
one level of the federal system to override economic principles of
competitive markets operating at another.229 The necessary attri-
butes of an entity receiving state action immunity should reflect
those same democratic considerations, and the test for state action
immunity should therefore include them as well. 
227. Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 27.
228. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
229. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
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There is, unfortunately, no ready-made candidate for such a
standard. Other areas of the law dealing with these questions, such
as private nondelegation and constitutional state action, are poor
candidates as sources for clear rules to apply in antitrust, and they
may not be perfectly adapted for doing so.230 Determining state
action for the purpose of constitutional review may call upon dif-
ferent considerations than determining it for the purpose of anti-
trust immunity.231 But one can draw parallels and some of them are
highlighted by North Carolina State Board itself.232 
Any approach to applying state action in antitrust must have at
its core the political accountability that defines republican govern-
ment.233 Hallie has its problems, but its attention to the importance
of political accountability234 is both intuitively appealing and con-
sistent with broader approaches to the American constitutional
order, such as the representation reinforcement concerns that oper-
ate in constitutional law.235 The relationship between the active su-
pervision requirement and political accountability is no accident,
and although the active supervision requirement itself makes little
sense as currently applied,236 the accountability it seeks to provide
is perhaps the quintessential feature of republican government and
worthy of recognition as part of the state action doctrine. I would go
a step further to say that if the political structure of a regulator
comports with republican government generally (as in the case of a
legislature), the professional composition of the regulator is ir-
relevant, contra the Court’s approach in North Carolina State
Board.237
What is needed instead of emphasis on the financial incentives of
regulators is a conception of “antitrust accountability” to accompany
the “antitrust state action” doctrine. That accountability might look
exactly like democratic accountability, or it might vary in some
ways. But having political accountability as the goal is likely to take
230. See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
231. See supra Part II.B.2.
232. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110-11 (2015).
233. See Amar, supra note 10, at 749.
234. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
236. See infra Part III.B.
237. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
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the Court in the right direction, certainly more so than attention to
the financial incentives of regulators does.
B. The Problem(s) with Midcal
If the Court’s exertions in North Carolina State Board have done
anything, they have demonstrated the problems with the Court’s
shift in Midcal away from Parker’s political view of state action
toward an economically driven one. That shift in Midcal was of a
piece with the Court’s larger reworking of antitrust to take greater
account of efficiency in evaluating competitive harms, a movement
with its origins in the Chicago and Harvard Schools, and one that
has generally led to more rationalized antitrust doctrine. But that
focus on efficiency, attractive as it might be for the evaluation of
restraints, has no place in the political calculus at the heart of the
state action doctrine. It is only because Midcal produced such a
stylized inquiry into state action that the Court was able to miss the
larger political question presented in North Carolina State Board
for the narrower one of competitive self-interest. Nor has the
struggle to apply Midcal’s active supervision requirement seemed
to have been worth the effort—the Court has yet to find a private
firm immune for its own anticompetitive acts, and it is unlikely ever
to need to do so given the availability of Fisher and Noerr/Penning-
ton. The number of firms that can actually avail themselves of the
active supervision requirement that could not avoid liability either
under the no-agreement theory of Fisher238 or under Noerr/Penning-
ton239 is effectively zero. 
The Court’s state action jurisprudence shows that state action is
meaningfully available only for political subdivisions, such as
municipalities. Given that, recognition that state action is actually
a feature of political rather than private entities will remove the
confusion that prompted the active supervision requirement in
Midcal240 and its subsequent abrogation in Hallie for those exact
238. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266, 270 (1986).
239. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
240. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
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entities.241 The Hallie distinction between cities’ and firms’ economic
incentives itself, which is premised on politico-regulatory fantasy,
is an unworthy feature of federal competition law. If rethinking
Midcal did no more than eliminate the need for the Hallie distinc-
tion, it would be worth it. Either way, removing state action im-
munity as an unattainable goal for private firms can go a long way
toward rationalizing the doctrine and setting it on its proper,
political footing.
C. The Dubious Constitutionality of State Licensing Boards
Although this Article might be taken as a criticism of the outcome
in North Carolina State Board, it is far from that. Shifting to a focus
on the political composition of state licensing boards shows not that
North Carolina State Board went too far to restrict them, but rather
that it did not go far enough. The Midcal framework for state action
means that the only change needed for state licensing boards struc-
tured such as North Carolina’s is active supervision by a state ac-
tor.242 A political view of state action would require much more, such
as either the general election of a board or, more likely, appointment
by politically responsible state officials, such as the Commission in
Parker.243 Although prompted by broader concerns about the com-
petitive effects of professional licensing boards on the economy,244
the arguments advanced in North Carolina State Board provide a
narrow basis—self-interest—for challenging those boards. Whether
a constitutional fix would require more changes to a particular
board than North Carolina State Board does will depend on the
composition of the board, but, regardless of whether it would con-
demn or spare more licensing boards, a political theory would seek
to make sure licensing boards and other forms of industry-specific
241. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
242. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1117 (“If a State wants to rely on active market
participants as regulators, it must provide active supervision if state-action immunity under
Parker is to be invoked.”).
243. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943) (describing political accountability of
the Commission’s members).
244. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L. REV. 1387
(2016); Einer Elhague, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1991); Brief of
Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, N.C. State Bd. of Dental
Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534), 2014 WL 3908427.
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regulation serve the political values of state electorates rather than
the competitive market values of the FTC.
D. Merging Noerr/Pennington and State Action
Re-examining the politics of state action reveals an obvious
connection between the state action doctrine and the Noerr/Penning-
ton doctrine, which Justice Scalia described in Omni Outdoor as “a
corollary to Parker.”245 Cases such as Omni Outdoor, which empha-
size the political dimensions of state regulation,246 provide the
clearest connections between the two doctrines. Indeed, the sym-
metry of Noerr/Pennington and Parker247 is only hidden because of
the artificial nature of the Midcal framework.
North Carolina State Board itself provides ample demonstration
of the value of bringing the Noerr/Pennington and state action
doctrines closer together. In North Carolina State Board, thinking
about the values underlying Noerr/Pennington—the need to provide
space for self-interested actors to engage the regulatory process248—
could have helped the Court recognize the unrealistic demands of
the self-interest limitation advanced by the FTC. Moreover, Noerr/
Pennington lends itself to the same, identity-driven analysis as a
political approach to state action does: both approaches hinge on
whether the Board is the state for regulatory purposes. If the Board
is itself the state, then there can be no liability for one of two
reasons. Either the agreement of the dentists to use the Board is
immunized under Noerr/Pennington,249 or, under Fisher, we would
view the state’s action as unilateral, again defeating the agreement
requirement, albeit as a matter of state action.250 All of these differ-
ent approaches are of a piece to the same tenet of antitrust law ex-
emplified equally and consistently by Parker and Noerr/Penning-
245. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991).
246. See id. at 383-84.
247. Compare supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Parker), with supra Part I.B.1 (discussing cases
applying the state action doctrine to private parties, including Noerr/Pennington).
248. See Omni Outdoor, 449 U.S. at 383-84; supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
249. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671 (1965); E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1961).
250. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266, 270 (1986).
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ton: Regulatory acts by states do not lead to liability under Sec-
tion 1.251 
Introducing Noerr/Pennington into state action analysis would
obviate the need for the Midcal/Hallie framework. Consider the
collective ratemaking at issue in Southern Motor Carriers.252 The
Court made it clear that if the states were providing active super-
vision through tariff review of the rates proposed by the collective,
then the rate bureaus could qualify for immunity under state
action.253 Noerr/Pennington, by immunizing the collective act of
petitioning for the joint rates,254 could lead to exactly the same
outcome through similar means—the establishment and operation
of the rate approval authority would substitute for the clearly
articulated state policy of displacing competition, and the independ-
ent consideration of the rates would substitute for active supervi-
sion.
Merging the two doctrines would carry additional benefits, like
allowing each to borrow features from the other, such as Noerr/
Pennington’s sham exception.255 It would also recognize that state
action immunity might be appropriate even if defeating competitive
forces is not a clearly articulated goal of state regulation, as all
regulation harms competition in some way, even if not as part of a
clearly articulated policy.256 By focusing less on the specifics of par-
ticular regulation and more on the structure of the entity at issue,
the Court can provide greater predictability in state action cases.
For instance, in Phoebe Putney, instead of interrogating statutory
text to determine whether it might contain an articulated policy of
displacing competition,257 the Court could have asked: “Does the
hospital authority have the kind of accountability necessary to deem
its acts those of the state for purposes of antitrust immunity?” The
hospital authority at issue, which was formed and governed by
251. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144-45; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943).
252. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50 (1985).
253. See id. at 62, 66.
254. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
255. See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 63, 65
(1993).
256. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
257. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226-27 (2013).
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political subdivisions of the state,258 may very well have had such
accountability, at least if the cities that formed it had the requisite
accountability.
CONCLUSION
In North Carolina State Board, when confronted with a pro-
foundly undemocratic regulatory system, the Supreme Court re-
sponded not by upholding the republican values that form the basis
of modern democratic government, but instead by pointing to the
likelihood that the residents of North Carolina might have to pay
too much for whiter teeth.259 While the Court may have saved us
all from the clutches of rent-seeking dentists and the perils of pricey
teeth whitening, it ignored democracy in the process. It would be
fair to ask whether the Court was focused on the right problem.
When considered against the possibility that North Carolina could
randomly pick someone out of the Raleigh phonebook and desig-
nate that person the state dental regulator without review, the
FTC’s concern that person might have a conflict of interest by virtue
of a financial interest in dentistry borders on the petty.
Yet antitrust’s state action doctrine, as it has developed over
time, drove the Court to just such a result. Moreover, the Court’s
economic focus on the harms of state action has caused the Court to
ignore the political value of state action immunity. For instance,
the Court described state action as a “disfavored” doctrine,260 when
it is in fact a necessary component of federalism. Anticompetitive
state regulation, as distasteful as it might be to economists, is an ex-
pression of state political systems in exactly the same way as other
forms of regulation are; there is no reason to single out regulation
that harms competition—as indeed all regulation harms competition
to some degree261—for especially disfavorable treatment.
State action presents some very difficult questions—some going
to core ideas about republican government that border on the
imponderable. But whether the Board is the state for purposes of
258. See id. at 220-21.
259. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111-14 (2015).
260. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992).
261. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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state action immunity is not one of them. The Court should simplify
the state action doctrine and return it to its roots. By doing so, the
Court can both clarify the doctrine within antitrust and better
situate antitrust within the constellation of laws that protect both
the competitive landscape and America’s political identity.
